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SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS
Plaintiff brought this action against Monte Vista
Ranch, Inc. and its former shareholders to collect a real
estate

commission

(R.

1-4) .

The

shareholders

sold

the

corporation's assets (consisting mainly of real property) to
Leland Fitzgerald by selling their stock in Monte Vista (R.
182-195).

Plaintiff

procured

the

sale

(R.

152) .

The

Earnest Money Agreement between Monte Vista and its former
shareholders and Leland Fitzgerald required Fitzgerald to
pay plaintiff's real estate commission (R. 152). In a prior
action,

plaintiff

sued

Fitzgerald

for

his

commission.

Plaintiff first alleged that he had some kind of a joint
purchase agreement with Fitzgerald (R. 153, 253). Plaintiff
later amended that pleading to simply sue for a commission
(R. 153).
Plaintiff
Fitzgerald.

The

lost

record

the

does not

prior

action

show what

specific defense to plaintiff's claims was

against

Fitzgerald's

(R. 253).

The

trial court in this case acknowledged that the basis of the
decision against plaintiff on his claim against Fitzgerald
was unclear (Id.)
In its memorandum decision, the trial court refers
to Wallace Ohran.
a major

Mr. Ohran was Monte Vista's president and

shareholder before the sale to Fitzgerald.

The

other individual defendants are Monte Vista's other former
shareholders (R. 182-195).

Neither Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.
-1-

nor its former shareholders were sued by plaintiff in the
prior action (R. 17) •

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants did not introduce any evidence of what
the prior case was all about.

They relied solely on the

reported appellate decision of the prior case.

That deci-

sion does not reveal what the underlying issues really were
in the prior case.

Thus, defendants did not meet their

burden of showing that no material issue of fact on the res
judicata and collateral estoppel claims.

The trial court

relied upon defendants' incomplete submission and reached
the wrong result.
The determination that the trial court erred can
be made from the materials of record in this case.
The State of Frauds does not preclude recovery
because Ohran admitted the existence of plaintiff's contract
in court and because

the

"contract was

fully performed.

Additionally, the sale ultimately became a sale of stock to
which the Statute of Frauds does not apply rather than a
sale of real property.
POINT I
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DEMONSTRATES
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS
BASED UPON AN INCORRECT ASSUMPTION
Defendants

admitted

plaintiff

did

not

file any

complaint against Monte Vista Ranch or its former shareholders in the prior action (R. 17) .

Defendants admitted that

Fitzgerald
Vista's

filed
former

a

third-party

shareholders

complaint
(R.

against

17).

Monte

Fitzgerald's

third-party complaint in the prior action was for indemnification from Monte Vista's former shareholders if plaintiff
recovered from Fitzgerald (R. 17).
The issues in Fitzgerald's third-party indemnification

suit

plaintiff

were

asserted

completely
against

different

Fitzgerald.

original brief, pp. 14-16).

than
(See

the

issues

plaintiff's

The indemnification suit was

based upon language in the stock purchase agreement between
Fitzgerald

and Monte Vista's

former

shareholders

to the

effect that each party would reimburse the other for any
liability for commissions (R. 189). Such an arrangement was
circular.

Under those terms, ultimate payment would depend

on whom plaintiff sued first.

But the Earnest Money Agree-

ment between Fitzgerald and Monte Vista's former shareholders clearly

stated

that as between Monte Vista's

former

shareholders and Fitzgerald, Fitzgerald would be responsible
(R. 152).

Thus, the court in the prior action ruled that

Fitzgerald would be liable to plaintiff (R. 155).
This ruling was referred to in a jury instruction
(R. 155) .

Both in its ruling on res judicata and in its

ruling on collateral estoppel, the trial court assumed that
one result of the prior action was that "the courts hearing
the previous action" were persuaded " that liability for the
commission cannot be imputed to the defendant Ohran" (R.

251-254, quoting from 253).

A copy of the trail court's

order is attached as Exhibit "A".
As

against

plaintifff

the

courts

in the

prior

action could not and did not make that determination because
plaintiff did not bring any claim against Monte Vista or its
shareholders

in

that

prior

action

(R.

17) .

The

trial

court's ruling was based upon an assumption that was clearly
erroneous.
POINT II
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DEMONSTRATES THAT
THE COURT DID NOT HAVE ANY ADEQUATE RECORD
OF THE PRIOR CASE BEFORE IT
Defendant argues that the rule that the court must
independently

examine the record of a prior

case before

making a res judicata or collateral estoppel ruling is not
applicable because there was a reported appellate decision
of the case against Fitzgerald,
authority for their argument.

Defendants did not cite any
Further, collateral estoppel

and res judicata require a showing that the issues in the
prior case and the pending one are the same.
v. Searle, 588 P.2d

689

(Utah 1978).

Searle Bros.

Even if defendants

could rely on a reported decision, any such opinion would
have to be complete enough to make that determination.

It

is not enough to just show plaintiff lost.
The

record

in this

case demonstrates

that

the

reported decision, Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald,
626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981), was not complete enough to make a
proper determination of collateral estoppel.

The reported

decision mentioned plaintiff's contention that the verdict
should have been directed

in his

favor.

But the court

disposed of that argument without specifying what the actual
claims of the parties were.

The majority of the reported

decision simply dealt with the adequacy of a jury instruction.

The appellate decision did not go into significant

detail on specific allegations or specific conclusions.
The trial court admitted in its memorandum decision that it did not know what the actual arrangement was
between plaintiff and Fitzgerald:
Although the Utah Supreme was unable to
determine from the record the exact
nature of the dealings between Florence
and Fitzgerald, the court noted several
facts that cast serious
doubt on
whether any money that passed or would
have passed between them should be
characterized as a commission
(upon
Fitzgerald's
agreement to pay it),
Fitzgerald and plaintiff Florence were
still negotiating as to their possible
joint purchase of the assets of Monte
Vista.
(R. 253).
After expressing this uncertainty, the trial court
clearly showed that its decision on collateral estoppel as
well as res judicata was based on its assumption that the
court made a determination that Monte Vista's former shareholders did not owe anybody (including plaintiff) anything:
Irrespective of the actual agreement
that emerged between Fitzgerald and
Florence, this court is persuaded, as
were the courts hearing the previous
action, that liability for the commission cannot be imputed to the defendant
Ohran" [Monte Vista's former shareholder] .
(R. 253).

As
Defendants

we

have

shown,

admitted

that

plaintiff

conclusion

did

not

bring

was

wrong.

an

action

against Monte Vista or its former shareholder in the prior
action (R. 17). Thus determination that Monte Vista and its
former

shareholders

owed

nothing

to plaintiff

could

not

possibly have been made.
POINT III
DEFENDANTS DID NOT MEET THEIR
BURDEN OF PROOF
Defendants argue that plaintiff is, nevertheless,
collaterally

estopped

from

asserting

any

claims

against

Monte Vista or its former shareholders because the prior
action

at

least

determined

plaintiff anything.

that Fitzgerald

did

not

owe

But, before collateral estoppel could

apply, we would need to know why the prior court made that
decision.
were.

We would need to know what the precise issues

Schear v. State, 657 P.2d 689 (Utah 1983).
The fact that plaintiff did the work which pro-

cured the sale is not disputed.

The Earnest Money Agreement

establishes that fact by specifying that plaintiff's commission should be taken care of

(R. 152) .

The record also

establishes that plaintiff was only paid $5,000 (R. 154) on
what was at least a $1,400,000 sale (R. 185).
By specifying that plaintiff's real estate commission was

to

be

paid,

defendants

acknowledged

plaintiff

procured the sale and earned a commission of some kind (R.
152) .

The record also contains a six page transcript from

Wallace Ohranfs deposition in the prior case (R. 81-87), a
copy of which is attached as

Exhibit "B" hereto).

In that

transcript, Ohran admits that the shareholders at one time
agreed to pay plaintiff a 6% commission (R. 81).
The trial court did not understand the basis for
the decision in the prior case (R. 25 3).

We have shown that

it could not have been based on failure to perform, or
payment which would be the usual reasons.

The record in

this case shows that plaintiff and Fitzgerald were negotiating some kind of a joint purchase of the subject property
that never took place (R. 146-147, 154, 253).
It was defendants1 burden to show that collateral
estoppel applies.

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby
(Utah 1979).

Ins. Co., 594 P.2d

1332

Mere assertions that no genuine fact question

exists are no more valid than mere assertions that a fact
question exists.

See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah

1983) .
For collateral estoppel to apply, defendants would
have to show what the precise
were —

issues

in the prior case

not just that plaintiff lost.

Defendants did not

introduce any evidence on what the underlying contentions
and facts were in the prior case and relied solely on the
incomplete

reported

brief, pp.11-14).

decision.

(See plaintiff's

original

Defendants did not meet their burden.

After reviewing defendants' authorities, plaintiff
acknowledges that defendants are probably right when they

argue the material not in the record

(Exhibits C and D to

plaintiff's brief in chief) cannot be considered on appeal.
But the trial court erred by ruling without
similar material.

considering

The record in this case demonstrates that

defendants did not meet their burden of showing that no
material fact issue exits concerning the application of res
judicata or collateral estoppel.

The court does not have to

consider materials not in the record to make that determination.
POINT IV
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE
OHRAN ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT
The

trial

court

properly

refused

to

decision on the Statute of Frauds (R. 251-254) .

base

its

An admis-

sion in pleadings, depositions, or in open court satisfies
the Statute of Frauds.
(Utah 1984).

Bentley v. Potter, 694 P. 2d 617

Defendants admitted that a contract existed.

Ohran admitted on page 528, lines 10-14 of the
cases1

prior
agreed

transcript

to pay

plaintiff

that Monte Vista's
a

6%

commission.

shareholder's
The

relevant

testimony came in as follows:
Q:

(By Mr. DeBry) The question was: "Tell me,
to the best of your recollection, what was
said during this conversation." And do you
recall at that time that you testified: "I
told Mr. Florence that we would agree to sell
the property to his buyers and to pay him a
six percent commission."
Was that your
testimony at this time we gave the deposition?

A:

(By Wallace Ohran) That was my
that is right. (R. 234-235).

testimony,

Defendants

assert

that

this

admission

is

not

sufficient because the term "we" allegedly does not identify
the promisors.

In context, however, it clearly refers to

Monte Vista and its former shareholders.

Moreover, it is

well established that ambiguities in the materials used to
satisfy

the

evidence.

Statute of Frauds
Johnson

v. Allen,

can be resolved
158 P.2d

Johnson v. Ogle, 181 P.2d 789
"Statute of Frauds" §296.
party.

134

(Mont. 19

by parol

(Utah

1945);

) ; 72 Am Jur.2d

This includes the identity of a

72 Am Jur.2d "Statute of Frauds" §297 n.45, n.46.
Defendants

further protest on the grounds that

plaintiff merely referred the court to the admission and did
not set it out fully for the trial court.

But defendants

themselves set the quote out fully in their own memorandum
to the trial court (R. 234-235) .
plaintiff's

citation

was

wrong

They did not assert that
or

argue

that

plaintiff

needed

to do more to place the issue before the court.

(Id.).

The matter was presented to the trial court with

defendants1

approval as to the form of submission.

cannot complain now.

They

Board of Education of Salt Lake City

v. Bothwell & Swanor, 400 P.2d 568 (Ut. 1965). 1

Additionally, the contention that plaintiff
should have borne the burden of setting forth the actual
testimony is raised from the first time on appeal. Even if
there were merit to this argument, it should not be
considered for that reason alone. Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d
405 (Utah 1977).

Defendants also ignore other writings and admissions.

Admittedly, the phrase in the Earnest Money Agree-

ment that makes Fitzgerald responsible to pay plaintiff's
commission (as between Monte Vista's former shareholders and
Fitzgerald)

does

not

specify

the

amount

of

plaintiff's

commission.

Arguably, that could be supplied by custom.

Richards

Hodson, 485

v.

P.2d

1044

(Utah

1971);

Ney

v.

Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1956); 72 Am Jur.2d "Statute
of Frauds" §297.

At the minimum, the Earnest Money Agree-

ment (R. 152 and attached as Exhibit "C") together with the
Stock Sale Agreement

(R. 182-195) , conclusively shows that

Monte Vista's former shareholders are the "we" referred to
in Ohran's admission.

The material necessary to satisfy the

Statute of Frauds need not be contained in one writing but
may be pieced together from several sources.
Hess,

162 P.

70

(Utah

1916);

72 Am

Jur.2d

Fritsch v.
"Statute of

Frauds" §371.
Ohran's actual deposition testimony referred to in
his in-court admission is attached as Exhibit B.
of the record (R. 81-87).

It is part

Using the term "we," Ohran admits

to an agreement to pay plaintiff a 6% commission on the sale
of the property

(R. 81) .

It is clear from the transcript

that the "we" refers to Monte Vista and its former shareholders.

(See, for example, R.84, lines 23 and 24; R. 85,

line 13, and the entire context of the admission).

1 n

POINT V
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY
BECAUSE THE CONTRACT WAS FULLY PERFORMED
Part performance generally satisfies the Statute
of Frauds. 73 Am Jur.2d "Statute of Frauds" §405, et. seq.
Utah follows the general rule.
P.2d 282 (Utah 1942).
performed.

Greenwood v. Jackson, 128

In the present case, plaintiff fully

This is not just a part performance case.
Defendants rely heavily on Smith Realty Co. v.

Dipietro, 292 915 (Utah 1930) and Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 40
(Utah 1920) to support their conclusion that the doctrine of
part performance does not apply in situations where a real
estate broker seeks his commission when no written contract
for

that

commission

exists.

Both

Smith

Realty

Co. v.

-

Dipietro, supra and Case v. Ralph, supra were decided before
the Rules of Court Procedure were
notice pleading.

liberalized

to permit

A close reading of both those cases shows

that they were each decided on the basis that the plaintiffs
did not adequately allege that any kind of a contract for a
commission existed.
Defendants also cite Young v. Buchanan, 259 P. 2d
876 (Utah 1953) and Watson v. Odell, 198 P. 772 (Utah 1921).
Neither of these cases actually held that full performance
does

not

satisfy

the

Statute

of

Frauds

in real

estate

commission cases.

Watson v. Odell, supra, held that the

real

could

estate

agent

not

recover

under

the

specific

wording of his contract where the underlying sale did not
occur.

Young v. Buchanan, supra held that an unlicensed

real estate agent could not use a licensed broker's license
when he was acting as an independent contractor rather than
an employee•

To be sure, the cases defendants cite hold

that a real estate commission cannot be recovered under a
quantum merit theory.

But they do not establish any rule

that full performance of an express contract cannot satisfy
the Statute of Frauds in real estate commission cases.
To plaintiff's knowledge, the only Utah case which
has squarely decided whether full performance satisfies the
Statute of Frauds in real estate commission cases is Kerr v.
Hillyard,

170 P.

981

(Utah

1918).

That case held

performance would satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

full

Like Kerr

v. Hillyard, the pending case does not involve a situation
where the agent found a willing buyer but the sale did not
go through.

The contract was not just partly performed, it

was fully performed.

That satisfies the Statute of Frauds.
POINT VI

PLAINTIFF DID NOT ACT AS A
SECURITIES BROKER DEALER
The sale in this case was finally effected as a
sale of stock

(R. 182-195).

Thus, the Statute of Frauds

should not apply at all.
The

argument

applies because

a stock

selling property.

Statute

plaintiff was not

broker is without merit.
arrange

that the

sale

a

of Frauds

licensed

still

securities

First, plaintiff never intended to
(R. 152) .

He

always

felt he was

He did not take part in changing the form

of the transaction and did not even learn that the form of
transaction had been changed until well after the Stock
Purchase Agreement had been executed (R. 197-198)•
Secondly, the transaction was an

isolated one.

The Securities Laws in effect at that time defined a securities "broker-dealer" as a person "engaged in the business of
effecting

transactions

in securities

others or for his own account."
Annotated.

for the

account of

Section 61-1-13 Utah Code

Because the transaction was an isolated one

and

because plaintiff did not play a part in changing the form
of the deal, plaintiff was not "in the business" of dealing
in securities.

He was not a securities "broker-dealer" and

did not have to be licensed as such.
Yet the sale was consummated as a sale of stock
(R. 182-195).

Thus, the transaction does not fall within

the literal wording of the Statute of Frauds.
CONCLUSION
The real issue in this case is not res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the Statute of Frauds.

The real

issue in this case is whether plaintiff intended to release
Monte Vista and its former shareholders from all liability
when he tried to secure payment from Fitzgerald.

That issue

is a fact question that has never been addressed.

The case

should be remanded for determination of that issue.
DATED this

3 /uA

day of January, 1986.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

(Appeal

from the

Summary Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah
County, Honorable David Sam)

(Trimble v. Monte Vista Ranch,

Inc., et al.) , was mailed this %/iJ day of

/Ja^/j^,
v

198$>, to the following:

,
^

M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
Attorneys for Defendants
90 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 683
Provo, Utah 84603

W///y^y/^,

1 A

Exhibit A

^ILED
FOURTH JMU'IAI DISTK^.I MUX]
OF UTAh • ::sT \$it:\ n? (»UH

1355 JUN - 4 PH J 4 3

In the Fourth Judicial District C o u r t ^ F : : ^ .
MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE

of the State of Utah
In and For Utah County
MINUTE ENTRY
Plaintiff

CASE NUMBER
MONTE V I S T A R A N C H r i N C , A UTAH
CORPORATION, WALLACE D. OHRAN,
RAY E. NELSON, HOWARD D. SHERWOOD'
JOYCE T . RICE AND NELDON Defendant
WILLIAMS

DATED

60,784

June 3, 1985
JUDGE

David Sam

This case is .before the court on Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss and is considered pursuant to Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice
of the District Courts.
R U L I N G
When examined under the doctrine of res judicata, it is apparent
the case at bar rests on the same state of facts and evidence of the
same character as were presented in Mel Trimble Real Estate et al v.
Leiand A. Fitzgerald, Civil No. C-78-4944.

The trial court in that

case, after hearing the witnesses who would appear and viewing the
documents that would be introduced in this suit, ruled as a matter
of law, that Fitzgerald was solely liable for any real estate commission that may have been owed Florence.

The jury sitting in that

action was so instructed after the court explicitly rejected an instruction related to third party beneficiary contracts.

Undoubtedly

PAGE TWO
# 60,784

the p r e c i s e issue at bar was fully and finally litigated
four day trial which resulted
due F l o r e n c e .

in the

in a verdict that no commission

On a p p e a l , the Utah Supreme Court

was

upheld the

decision finding no error in the trial court's ruling or

instruction.

Mel Trimble Real Estate v. F i t z g e r a l d , 626 P.2d 453 ( 1 9 8 1 ) .

This

court clearly lacks j u r i s d i c t i o n to review the application of law
or findings of fact in that case and c o n s e q u e n t l y

lacks

to relitigate the issue of liability for the alleged

jurisdiction

commission.

T h e r e f o r e , the instant action is barred under the doctrine of res
j udicata.
M o r e o v e r , even if this suit could be characterized

as arising

from a cause of action different from that p r e v i o u s l y tried, it is
barred under the d o c t r i n e of collateral estoppel as adopted by the
Utah Supreme Court in Schaer v. State of Utah, 657 P.2d

1337, 1340,

1341 ( 1 9 8 3 ) .

adjudication

Clearly, the "issue decided in the prior

was identical with the one presented
1340.

in t h [ i s ] a c t i o n . . . ."

Id.at

The issue at the first trial and the present issue are

e s s e n t i a l l y the same, that is, w h e t h e r a real estate commission
due F l o r e n c e from the sale of Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. (Monte
and if so, who should pay the c o m m i s s i o n .

was

Vista),

The record shows that

defendant Ohran testified at that trial and was present for cross
e x a m i n a t i o n , and that evidence of the event surrounding the t r a n s action was fully p r e s e n t e d .

This court is unaware of any

occurence
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subsequent to the previous trial or appeal that would lead to the
introduction of evidence not fully considered

in the previous

action.

Secondly, the previous case was "decided on its merits. 1 1 Jjj.
at 1341.

Although the Utah Supreme Court was unable to determine

from the record the exact nature of the dealings between

Florence

and Fitzgerald, the court noted several facts that cast serious

doubt

on whether any money that passed or would have passed between them
should be characterized as a commission.

A p p a r e n t l y , even after

defendant Ohran, as seller, reduced the sales price offered by the
amount of the claimed commission

(upon Fitzgerald's agreement to

pay i t ) , Fitzgerald and plaintiff Florence were still

negotiating

as to their possible joint purchase of the assets of Monte
Irrespective of the actual agreement that emerged between

Vista.
Fitzgerald

and Florence, this court is persuaded, as were the courts hearing the
previous action, that liability for the commission cannot be imputed
to the defendant

Ohran.

Thirdly, there can be no serious claim that the issue in the
first case was not "competently, fully, and fairly litigated." JkL
As stated above, the Utah Supreme Court found no reversible
in the previous jury trial that lasted four days and
testimony from and

opportunity

relevant to this action.

errors

included

to cross examine all the witnesses

Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has

abandoned the rule requiring mutuality of the parties in a collateral
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estoppel c a s e .

"The established rule is that a stranger to a

judgment may assert a judgment against one w h o actually

litigated

an issue that was necessarily decided by t h e judgment and thereby
preclude the relitigation of the same issue."
588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1 9 7 8 ) .

Searle v. S e a r l e ,

The exception to the requirement of

mutuality is p a r t i c u l a r l y just in the case at bar where defendant
Ohran seeks to use the prior judgment as a shield to avoid

liability

in this suit because his alleged liability would depend on fact and
law previously determined and applied.

T h e r e f o r e , even if this suit

could be treated as arising from a cause of action different from
that underlying t h e previous action, p l a i n t i f f is b a r r e d , under the
doctrine of collateral e s t o p p e l , from bringing its claim against
defendants.
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear to this court that
plaintiff is barred from bringing this action against t h e instant
defendants.
A c c o r d i n g l y , d e f e n d a n t s ' Motion to Dismiss is granted, and
plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with p r e j u d i c e .

Costs to

defendants.
Dated t h i s

/ / i / 6 y June, 1 985

DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:

Robert B. Hansen
M. Dayle Jeffs

Exhibit B
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Fullmerfs Restaurant?
A.

No, I don't think so.
v

Q.

Tell me to the best of your recollection what was said.

I want you to recall the exact words that were used by you
and by Mr. Florence, and by Mr. Fitzgerald.
but actually what the parties said.

Not a summary

I donft want you to

summarize what happened in the meeting.

I want you to act

as a camera or a tape recorder as well as you can remember.
A.

As I remember it, we agreed -- I agreed I should say p^

that we would sell the ranch to Mr. Fitzgerald for $2,000,000.
and we would pay Mr. Cal Florence his commission.u^
Mr. Florence spoke up and said, "But we get the
cattle,lf and I —

I —

I thought a minute, and I says, "Well,

we have just changed the deal.

The deal if $1,875,000, and

you pay Mr. Florence his commission, but you don't get the
^

cattle."
That's —
0.

and that's the gist of it.

Now, that's what you said, and what did Fitzgerald say

to that?
A.

"That's fine."

Q.

Fitzgerald agreed to that proposal? ^ ^

A.

Right, he agreed to that.

Q.

When you talked about paying Mr. Florence a commission,

^

was anything said about how much of a commission?
A.

We were going to pay him 6 percent, s'
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1

Q.

2

y o u pay the 6 percent commission.

3

to

4

A.

5

p a i d the commission.

6

Q.

W h a t w a s the commission of 6 percent?

7

A.

I don't know.

8

considering.

9

a n d C a l , I have no k n o w l e d g e o f .

T h e conversation as I understand it w a s that 2 m i l l i o n ,
When y o u changed the deal

$ 1 , 3 7 5 , 0 0 0 , w i t h o u t the c a t t l e , Florence would

get a --

W e retained ownership o f the cattle and M r . F i t z g e r a l d

That's w h a t w e were going ""

w e w

£-£

As to any arrangement between M r . Fitzgerald
—

10

Q.

11

commission w o u l d be?

12

A.

13

W e w o u l d pay a 6 percent commission.

H

they got the cattle.

15

M r . F i t z g e r a l d pays the commission.

16

$ 1 , 8 7 5 , 0 0 0 , and we keep the c a t t l e . "

17

Q

M r . Fitzgerald said --

18

A.

"That's fine." « /

19

0.

Did M r . Florence say anything at that point?

20

A.

I don't recall.

21

0

Do y o u remember w h e t h e r anything else w a s said during

22

that m e e t i n g ?

23

A.

No , I don' t.

24

Q.

W h a t I'd like to do n o w -- she is working pretty hard --

25

M a y w e take five m i n u t e s , and stretch, and let her relax her
I

But w h a t w a s said at the m e e t i n g about h o w m u c h the

I -- I told M r . F i t z g e r a l d the price w a s $ 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 .
M r . Florence said that

I said, " N o , you don't get the cattle
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1

hands for a m i n u t e a n d drink w a t e r .

2

A.

Okay.

3

(Brief recess. )

4

M R . DeBRY:

Let's go o n t h e record.

5

Q.

I wanted to ask o n e thing to clear u p o n e ouestion.

6

W h e n y o u said to Fitzgerald, y o u reduced t>y« commission, b u t

7

y o u said y o u p a y the commission.

8

Why did you say to Fitzgerald you pay the ^ o m m i s s i o n ?

9

that shift?

W h y did \o u

sav

-^--^
i^y
^y

10

A.

11

thought h e w a s w o r k i n g f o r m e .

12

Q.

13

showed more loyalty for the o t h e r side, a n ^ s o

14

other side to p a y the commission?

15

A.

Right.

16

Q.

B u t that also enabled y o u to lower thb purchase p r i c e ,

17

is that true?

18

A.

Right, I lowered it t h e amount o f the c o m m i s s i o n . ^

19

Q.

W a s it your understanding in these n e ^ o t i a t i o n s

20

M r . Florence w a s , in fact, working f o r boti*

2i

to p u t both parties together?

22

working for you.

23

A.

24

sale.

25

0.
L

Because M r . Florence said, "We g e t the c a t t l e '' and I

When h e said something about the c a t t l e >

thought h e

you wanted

parries,

Y o u just s a i d

It was m y understanding h e w a s trying

you

thac he

to make

a

the

rhaC

trving
wasn't

ranch

I
P u t both parties together so that h e t-.ould a a k e
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23

A.

Right.

Q.

Have you given all the testimonv about this meeting?

Do you have any further recollection about what was said at
this meeting?

A.

I think we talked about the down payment.

n.

T

*Ihat was said about the down payment?

I think it was supposed to be a half a million dollars

Q.

Did Mr. Fitzgerald -- what did he respond to that?

A.

He agreed.

0.

Was anything said about the underlying mortgage?

A.

Not at that time.

0.

Remember anything else being said about closing dates or [

A.

I think -- I think somewhere along the line we talked

^

about closing it immediatelv after the 1st of the year.

! o.

After the meeting, did you have any further

J

conversations or contact with Mr. Florence on the subject of

the sale of the ranch or the property?
When was the next meeting?
!

I don't remember ]ust when it was , but I think we had a

A.

meeting with Mr. Florence and Mr. Fitzgerald, and also his
nephew -- is that right?

j

-- at Howard Sherwood's

Q.

Who is Howard Sherwood?

A.

One of the stockholders, and he one of the accountants

that took care of --

J

Where is Sherwood's office?

Q.
-
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A.

In American Fork.

0.

To place this in time, the meeting in American Fork,

about how many days or weeks was that meeting after this
meeting at Fullmer1s Restaurant?
A.

I don't know.

Q.

Who else was present at the meeting in December in

American Fork?
A.

But it had to be in December.

Tell me all the people that were present

I don't believe Nelson was there, was he?
MR. FLORENCE:

A.

At the meeting I was at, he was

It was Mr. Nelson -MR. FLORENCE:

That was the final draft of the

agreement between you and Fitzgerald and our conversation.
All stockholders had agreed to that.
A.

Was Perry, his nephew there, too?
MR, FLORENCE:

A.

Not at this particular meeting.

There was just three of us then, Nelson, and Ohran, and

Sherwood, and you.
MR, FLORENCE:

And Fitzgerald?

A.

And Fitzgerald.

Q.

Nelson, Ohran, Florence, and Fitzgerald, is that right?

A.

Yes.

0.

That meeting was at the office of Mr. Nelson?

A.

Mr. Sherwood.

0.

Who is Mr. Sherwood?

A.

He is the accountant x^ho took care of the books for the

^
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ranch, and a stockholder in the corporation.
Q.

Remember about what time of day that meeting was held?

A.

In the afternoon?

Q.

Do you remember who called the meeting, how the meeting

Yes.

was arranged, or who set the meeting up?
A.

I think Mr. Sherwood set it up.

Called Mr. Fitzgerald

and made an appointment with him, and we met with him at the
time that Sherwood and Fitzgerald worked out.
Q.

To your knowledge were any minutes, notes, or memoranda

kept of that meeting?
MR. FLORENCE:
MR. DeBRY:

Yeah, the earnest money was --

Let him ansx^er.

Just whatever you remember, any minutes or
notes or documents written down at that: meeting.
A.

The only thing that I remember is that Mr. Sherwood

wrote down the earnest money agreement and his secretary, as J*
I remember, he called his secretary in, and she typed it up.
Q.

Now, tell me to the best of your recollection what was

said at that meeting.
A.

What was said and done at that meeting?

As I remember, we -- Mr. Sherwood or Mr. Fitzgerald,

rather, agreed to buy the ranch on the terms that we had
outlined, and then Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Florence-went into
another room and had a private conversation about their
arrarTgauieuLs-;—aad-wftfen th£y came bacicin, Mr. Fitzgerald- says
that he would buy the entire ranch, and he would pav Mr.
DAVIS & SANCHEZ. 812 BOSTON BLDG., SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111, (801) 363-7939
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Florence1s commission.
Q.

TJhen he said he would buy the entire ranch, did he say

how much?

What purchase price was discussed?

A,

We had already agreed upon that.

Q.

It would be the $1,825,000 --

A.

875.

0.

Was anything else said, to your recollection, on the

subject of the purchase?

Just anything you can recall about

the meeting?
A.

No, except that earnest money was drawn up on those --

on that agreement and also put in the earnest money, the
buyer was to pay the commission.
Q.

Was earnest money executed at that time?

A.

Right.

Q.

Was an earnest money deposit paid?

A.

Yes.

0.

How much money?

A.

$25,000 is what he paid.

Q.

All right.

Where is that earnest money at the present

time, if you know, earnest money agreement?
A.

In Mr. Sherwood's office.

Q.

Now, after that meeting, have you ever at any time had

any conversation with Mr. Fitzgerald on the subject of Mr.
Florence's commission? ^ /
A.

No.

^y
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I

*

TO,

.American Fork
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-"Us-
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3 iv»'«t)» dapcttt with yow «» •*»!*•*! money |f»« ian» o< (1

4 ,nt.,<to.mot

i***.J>L-??nhsi-J*JL321

,. •»•.,••»• w». ./— . Lalanrl.A. -Fitzgerald
Twenty-five Thousand Dollars

,

p e r s o n a 1 check

..8,r,v.
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overXXZ'JXXZY.

-^^^m^^ssm^A^^^ca
.i-Alcrs
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„Co-PporatiYe_Security_ Corp *^-lia&..be.eiL-satisf l e d , .upon rmysu-.nt £>£.-SJL,Z50-£ia_piir_iicr
for. d.ry..land_ac.rcage,
..principal
payment_for i r r i g a t e d acrcage_and/or .$200.00 pt-r. acre principaJL.;^>Ticnt.--8.

l n ^ m t M i t<(M./^ |n« w»(M<0 lf4U«>(«. twhi«il In l"« i«m«l«lt«At ul «ny m»(l|<fi o# «•«!•»<I br !•»« »«»•< n«>«<n «%»w»«'0 «nn

i r.ot-«i

ir,....... ..«.p»
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